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The Effect of #MeToo on Gender-Related Shareholder Activism 
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of the #MeToo movement on gender-related shareholder proposals. 
#MeToo was first introduced by Tarana Burke in 2006 as a way to unite female victims of sexual assault. 
The movement officially took off in October 2017 following the Harvey Weinstein scandals and had 
significant spillover effects on shifting the legal and corporate culture; states began adopting policies to 
curb workplace sexual assault and placing quotas on companies to have a minimum number of females 
directors to be on their boards. A difference-in-differences regression analysis was used to determine if 
#MeToo also had any effects at raising shareholder support for gender-related proposals. The results 
show a very slight increase of 2.38% in the percent of votes in support for these proposals, although this 
estimate is insignificant. Even though #MeToo had no significant impact on gender-related shareholder 
activism, the level of support for social proposals did increase as a whole after the movement, which is an 
encouraging trend in the broader space of social activism. 
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 This study examines the impact of the #MeToo movement on gender-related shareholder 
proposals. #MeToo was first introduced by Tarana Burke in 2006 as a way to unite female 
victims of sexual assault. The movement officially took off in October 2017 following the 
Harvey Weinstein scandals and had significant spillover effects on shifting the legal and 
corporate culture; states began adopting policies to curb workplace sexual assault and placing 
quotas on companies to have a minimum number of females directors to be on their boards. A 
difference-in-differences regression analysis was used to determine if #MeToo also had any 
effects at raising shareholder support for gender-related proposals. The results show a very slight 
increase of 2.38% in the percent of votes in support for these proposals, although this estimate is 
insignificant. Even though #MeToo had no significant impact on gender-related shareholder 
activism, the level of support for social proposals did increase as a whole after the movement, 
which is an encouraging trend in the broader space of social activism.  
 




 In the past decade, social and political activism have been spurred on by an increasingly 
socially conscious generation of people who amplify their voices through the use of hashtags on 
social media and mass protests on the ground (Anderson, Toor, Rainie, and Smith 2018). In the 
private sector, there has been a parallel trend towards a greater emphasis on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and the pursuit of the triple bottom line. The convergence of social justice 
and profit-oriented motivations have led to the understanding that CSR is a risk to be managed, 
prompting an increase in CSR disclosure between 2006 – 2012 for firms in the U.S and 
contributions towards non-profit organizations (Michelon, Rodrigue, and Trevisan 2019). 
However, these outward displays of good social behavior are often one-time costs to the firm that 
is not reflective of real change (Michelon et al. 2019). Instead, sustainable long-term 
transformations that lead the firm towards better CSR performance must come from operational 
and policy changes within, which can be brought about through shareholder activism.  
 A recent example is the #MeToo movement, which caught traction with the help of social 
media following sexual assault allegations against celebrities in the fall of 2017. While various 
waves of feminism since the 1960s have advanced women’s rights significantly in many aspects 
of their personal and professional lives, #MeToo was a harsh awakening that there was still a lot 
that needed to be done on the issue of gender inequality in the workplace (Harnois 2008). This 
study aims to analyze the impact of the movement on corporations, specifically seeking to 
answer the question: Did the #MeToo movement improve the likelihood of gender-related 
shareholder proposals in affecting change? This paper will analyze the impact on two sides: from 
the perspective of the firm in terms of the degree of manager’s responsiveness to the proposal, 
and from the perspective of the shareholders in terms of the level of general support the proposal 
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receives if voted on at the annual meeting. Historically, social shareholder proposals have 
typically failed to acquire the sufficient amount of votes to pass, but the very existence of the 
proposal also has an impact on influencing subsequent corporate change (Rastad and Dobson 
2020).  
 Although there has been previous literature studying the effects of social movements on 
activism for CSR disclosure (Michelon et al. 2019), and the effects of shareholder proposals on 
board diversity (Rastad and Dobson 2020; Marquardt and Wiedman 2016), few have looked into 
the impact of social movements on gender-related shareholder proposals. This paper aims to 
bring this added dimension to the current literature through the use of the recent #MeToo 
movement in a difference-in-differences study and shed some light on the effectiveness of social 
movements in causing change in the private sector.  
2. Institutional Background  
 
2.1. Social Shareholder Activism  
 
 Social shareholder activism, as differentiated from financial shareholder activism by the 
focus on social and environmental issues, use their equity stake in the company to call for 
change, such as the establishment of new policy and better reporting to increase accountability.   
Since its inception in the 1960s, social shareholder activism has been ideologically linked to 
almost every major social movement, including civil rights, feminism, LGBT rights, and 
environmentalism (King and Gish 2015). While the early stages of such activism involved 
largely non-profits with low budgets using donated shares to file shareholder resolutions, 
institutional investors like socially responsible investing (SRI) firms began to play a larger role 
in the decades since the 1990s. Tactics used have also widened with the range of activists to 
include public letters for change, private dialogue with management, divestment campaigns, and 
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shareholder resolutions, whereby shareholders submit a proposal to be included in a public 
company’s proxy statement and to be voted on at the company’s annual meeting.  
 There are several procedural requirements established by the SEC that restricts who can 
file a shareholder resolution and when. Under the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, proposals can only 
be filed by shareholders that have held $2,000 value or 1% of a company’s securities for one 
year (Crenshaw 2020), and proposals must be received by the company at least 120 days before 
the release date of the firm’s proxy statement the previous year (SEC 2001). As a result, there 
will be a slight lag effect in the data, where shareholder resolutions filed after the #MeToo 
movement in October 2017 will likely not appear until the following year.  
 
2.2. #MeToo Movement 
 
The term “#MeToo” was originally coined in 2006 by Tarana Burke, a survivor of sexual 
assault, to help empower and unite fellow women and girls of color who had also survived 
sexual violence (Chicago Tribune 2020). Eleven years later on October 5, 2017, allegations that 
Harvey Weinstein had sexually assaulted multiple women appeared in the New York Times, 
prompting the hashtag to go viral online and bringing the #MeToo movement to the forefront of 
the public’s attention. Since then, #MeToo has touched almost every industry and has pressured 
state legislators to curb sexual assault and harassment in the workplace (Beitsch 2018). This has 
spilled over to broader gender-related issues, a notable example being California adopting a first-
of-its-kind law that requires a minimum number of female directors on the boards of 
corporations that are incorporated or headquartered in the state (Weinstein et al. 2019). 
In addition to a shifting legal culture, there has been an increase in social shareholder 
activism pushing for corporations to enact sexual harassment policies through proxy proposals, 
 7 
with spillover effects on other gender-related issues such as gender diversity on boards, and EEO 
disclosure (Katz and McIntosh 2018). In 2018, 5.1% of all shareholder proposals were gender-
related, an increase from 3.3% the year before (Norton 2018). The first shareholder proposals 
related to sexual harassment were jointly filed in January 2018 by Arjuna Capital and the New 
York State Common Retirement Fund for Facebook and Twitter (Katz and McIntosh 2018). 
These resolutions demanded each company to produce a report regarding the companies’ scope 
of platform abuses, and the efficacy of enforcement of their anti-harassment policies. Other 
notable institutional investors, such as BlackRock, State Street, CalPERS and CalSTRS have all 
added board diversity to their voting policies (Weinstein et al. 2019). 
3. Theoretical Frameworks and Hypotheses 
 
 The realm of social shareholder activism has its roots in stakeholder theory, which 
describes an organization’s composition as a collection of individual groups with various 
interests, and that business decisions should consider the interests of this collective group 
(McWilliams and Siegel 2001). This is in contrast to agency theory, the paradigm that has 
dominated traditional corporate governance discourse, whereby managers have a fiduciary duty 
only to their shareholders. When managers have to respond to the needs of multiple stakeholder 
groups that have heterogenous and conflicting interests between and within groups, stakeholder 
salience theory can help explain which stakeholder needs managers will most likely satisfy over 
others. In the context of activism, stakeholder salience can be applied to the differing needs 
among various shareholders. 
According to stakeholder salience theory, a concept introduced by Mitchell, Agle, and 
Wood in 1997, managers give priority to different stakeholder needs by their level of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency. Power is defined as a stakeholder’s ability to get another entity to do 
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something it otherwise would not have done, legitimacy refers to the perception that a 
stakeholder’s actions are desirable or appropriate, and urgency is the degree to which a 
stakeholder’s claims call for immediate attention.  
In a 2018 study on how stakeholder salience affects shareholder activism outcomes, Yang 
and Taylor identified that urgency is the main driver of salience in the context of shareholder 
activism on environmental issues. Urgency can be influenced by changing regulatory 
environments or major social movements; under social movement theory, during periods of 
instability, the mobilization in activism causes the existing status quo to be susceptible to 
influence (Cundill, Smart, and Wilson 2018). Thus, shareholder proposals submitted after a 
social movement in response to the issues that are relevant to the movement may be perceived by 
targeted managers to have an increased level of urgency, which pressures the managers to 
prioritize the demands of these proposals over the interests of other shareholders which are not 
related to the movement.   
There is a general agreement in the literature that it is difficult to establish causation 
between activism and subsequent changes in governance and corporate performance, causing 
ambiguous outcomes when studying the effects of shareholder activism (Cundill et al. 2018). 
One way to estimate the likelihood of a shareholder proposal’s implementation is to see the 
immediate level of manager’s responsiveness to shareholders through the action they decide to 
take. After a shareholder proposal is submitted, the manager can either choose to 1) withdraw, in 
which case this signals that they are receptive to the proposal and will engage in private dialogue 
with the shareholder, 2) allow the resolution to go to a vote, in which case this signals that they 
are neither directly receptive nor directly opposed, or 3) omit the resolution from the proxy 
statement by petitioning to the SEC under a rule violation, in which case this signals that they 
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may be opposed.1 Studies have shown that withdrawn proposals lead to a faster and higher 
likelihood of subsequent implementation compared to voted proposals (Rastad and Dobson 
2020; Bauer, Moers, and Viehs 2015). 
Combining stakeholder salience theory with social movement theory, the first hypothesis 
can therefore be constructed as follows: 
H1. Managers will be more responsive to gender-related shareholder proposals after the 
#MeToo movement than before.  
 From the shareholder support side, previous studies have shown that there is a spillover 
effect associated with shareholder activism, where firms respond to activism against their 
competitors, even when they themselves are not directly targeted (Ferri and Sandino 2009). 
Intuition suggests that this spillover effect also applies to shareholders of the targeted firms and 
that the magnitude of this effect is greater when social movements are involved. In fact, while 
the #MeToo movement is most directly related to shareholder proposals concerning sexual 
harassment, it has also had spillover effects in increasing the number of other gender-related 
proposals being submitted, thus leading to the second hypothesis: 
 H2. There will be greater shareholder support for gender-related proposals after the  







1 It could also be the case that there is an actual violation under the SEC.   
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4. Data and Research Method 
 
4.1. Data Source 
 
Shareholder proposal data for publicly listed US firms will be collected from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) over the period of January 2014 – December 2020. The sample 
consists of 2925 resolutions, with 1285 proposals having voting data and 1640 without.  
This sample of proposals will be split into a treatment group, which consists of all the 
proposals that are gender-related, and a control group, which includes all the proposals that are 
focused on sustainability issues excluding gender during the same time period. Gender-related 
proposals fall under four general categories relating to sexual harassment policy, eliminating the 
gender pay gap, board diversity, and EEO-1 disclosure. The final dataset has 95 observations in 
the treatment group and 1190 observations in the control. 
 The time period will be split into a before period, which will stretch from January 2014 
to December 2017, and an after period from January 2018 to December 2020. Although the 
#MeToo movement begins in October 2017, procedural requirements regarding shareholder 
proposals introduces a lag effect that makes gender-related proposals that are raised in response 




A difference-in-differences (DiD) approach will be used as a basis of analysis for both 
hypotheses. To test the first hypothesis, the average proportion of withdrawn proposals relative 
to the total number of proposals will be used as a proxy variable for the level of manager 
receptivity, where withdrawn proposals indicate that managers are willing to commit to the 
proposal or have at least committed to engage in private negotiations with the shareholder. 
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Proposals are more likely to be implemented when they are sponsored by shareholders with 
greater ability to exert pressure on managers, such as institutional investors (Ertimur, Ferri, and 
Stubben 2010). Thus, to control for the perceived power of shareholders that also affects how 
managers will respond, fixed effects will be added for the type of proponent. The possible types 
are: fund, company, religious, special interest, SRI fund, individual, union, other, and public 
pension. Some resolutions may be filed through a joint effort by multiple parties, in which case 
they may have more than one type of sponsor.  
To test the second hypothesis, the average percentage of votes will be used to measure 
the level of shareholder support between the control and treatment groups in each year across the 
pre- and post-movement periods. There are three different voting bases that ISS uses to calculate 
the percentage of votes in support for a resolution: votes for and against; votes for, against and 
abstained; and votes outstanding. For this study, the votes in favor of a proposal will be out of 
the for, against, and abstained votes because this represents the shareholders that had to make an 
active voting decision about the resolution. Fixed effects for sponsor type will also be added to 
the regression. 
The DiD regression model is as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖 × 𝑝 +  𝜀  
where 𝑥𝑖 is the treatment assignment variable equal to one if resolution 𝑖 is gender-related, zero 
if not, 𝑝 is the post-treatment indicator equal to one if the resolution is filed post 2018, zero if 
filed before 2018. The coefficient, 𝛽3, is the DiD estimate, and will capture the change in 
percentage of votes for gender-related resolutions relative to the change in percentage of votes 
for other social resolutions.  
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In order to conduct the difference-in-differences analysis, parallel trends must exist in the 
pre-event period between the treatment and control. To determine this, a leads-and-lags 
regression will be run with dummy variables for each year, where the year before the event is 
omitted to act as the baseline:  
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2014 + 𝛽4𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2015 + 𝛽5𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2016
+ 𝛽6𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2018 + 𝛽7𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2019 + 𝛽8𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2020 +  𝜀  
If the regression estimates of the interaction terms for 2014, 2015 and 2016 are insignificant, 
then the two groups followed parallel trends in the pre-movement period.  
 
4.3. Additional Considerations 
 
 Although the #MeToo movement is most directly related to the issue of sexual 
harassment in the workplace, having such a tight constraint would have produced insufficient 
data for the treatment group. Thus, the treatment group was defined based on a broader definition 
that included all gender-related proposals. The full list and the number of observations for each 
type of resolution can be seen in Table 1. 
One concern about having a loose definition for gender-related proposals is that it will 
not directly capture the results of the #MeToo movement, especially for proposals that group 
other diversity categories in with gender, such as race and ethnicity. However, previous literature 
has shown that within the realm of social shareholder activism, there is strong spillover effects 
across firms and across resolutions, which would mitigate this issue (Ferri and Sandino 2009, 




 Table 1:  
 
Additionally, upon examination of the dataset, there was a lack of data available to test 
the first hypothesis. ISS provides 11 different statuses for the shareholder resolution ballot: 
omitted, withdrawn, final vote, meeting cancelled, meeting postponed, not filed, not in proxy, not 
presented, awaiting tally, pending, and not applicable. Given the range of categories and the 
limited number of resolutions that are withdrawn in the dataset, the rest of the study will focus on 
testing the second hypothesis, the average percentage of shareholder support, as measured by the 
percentage of votes in favor of a resolution. 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Determining Parallel Trends 
 
 The following figure and table illustrate the average percentage of votes resolutions 
received in the treatment and control groups. From 2014 to 2017, the average proportion of votes 
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remained fairly similar across both groups, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption is 
satisfied. However, the data begins to diverge in 2017. Both groups experienced a significant 
increase in the average percentage of shareholder support between 2017 and 2018, but the 
increase is higher for the treatment (10.11%) than the control (4.58%). This suggests that the 
#MeToo movement did have an impact on increasing support for gender-related proposals.  





Executing the leads-and-lags analysis confirms that the treatment and control groups 
followed parallel trends before 2018, validating the use of a difference-in-differences regression 
to estimate the effects of the #MeToo movement. Table 3 shows that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms for the period leading up to the movement are not significant.  
Table 3:  
 
 
5.2. Difference-in-Differences Regression  
 
Running an initial DiD regression without including fixed effects reveals that the 
#MeToo movement did not have a significant effect on gender-related proposals post-event. The 
DiD coefficient is negative, which seems to go against the hypothesis. However, there are many 






The subsequent difference-in-differences regression, with fixed effects for year and 
sponsor type, shows that the #MeToo movement did result in an increase in the percentage of 
votes for gender-related resolutions, although the effect is insignificant. Gender-related proposals 
received on average 2.38% more votes than non-gender-related ones.  
The effect size varies widely by the type of sponsor. Of the estimates that are significant, 
resolutions filed by individuals received on average 12.51% less votes compared to those filed 
by other types of proponents. In general, larger proponents, such as religious organizations and 
unions, have positive effects on the percentage of shareholder support. For instance, resolutions 
filed by religious and other organizations together received an average of 14.02% more votes, 
significant at the 5% level. The strongest positive effect comes from resolutions filed jointly by 
religious organizations and unions, with an average of 52.89% more votes, significant at the 










6. Discussion of Findings 
 
The results reveal that there is a positive impact of the #MeToo movement on gender-
related proposals, after controlling for year and sponsor type. Even though the difference-in-
differences estimate turned out to be insignificant, it does support the hypothesis that there will 
be greater shareholder support for gender-related proposals after the #MeToo movement than 
before to some degree. One possible reason that explains why the results were not significant 
could be the fact that firms in the control group were not entirely isolated from the effects of 
#MeToo. This social movement may have had spillover effects on all firms in relaying the 
message that social issues can bring material risk to the firm, leading to more shareholder 
support for these socially oriented proposals across both the treatment and control groups. 
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This study has a number of limitations, the most important of which involves the selected 
data used to measure the impact of #MeToo. Most of the shareholder resolutions that are gender-
related are not directly related to the #MeToo movement; this movement was started in response 
to sexual harassment, while the proposals chosen for the treatment group were mostly focused on 
the gender pay gap or the disclosure of firm diversity data. As such, it is hard to directly trace the 
impact of this specific social movement on the private sector. However, as the literature shows, 
the event did change the general regulatory and social activism environment, even though there 
was little impact found at the level of shareholder proposals. Another factor to consider is that 
the focus of this study, shareholder resolutions, represents only one way that shareholders can 
engage with the firm. Within social shareholder activism, there are numerous strategies that the 
shareholder can employ, from writing letters to the firm’s management team, to starting public 
campaigns. These strategies may have higher rates of success than shareholder resolutions.  
7. Conclusion and Future Directions  
 
On September 23, 2020, the SEC amended rule 14a-8 by altering the minimum 
ownership threshold needed before shareholders can submit a proposal. The existing threshold of 
$2,000 or 1% worth of shares for at least one year will be replaced by three alternative 
thresholds: a) $2,000 of the company’s securities for at least three years, b) $15,000 of the 
company’s securities for at least two years, or c) $25,000 of company’s securities for at least one 
year. This introduces an additional barrier for shareholders to submit resolutions with a 
disproportionate impact on individual investors, who are often the filers of CSR-related 
proposals. Moreover, from the findings, resolutions submitted by individual investors already 
receive significantly less votes compared to larger sponsors. Even though this recent amendment 
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is beyond the time frame for this paper, the impact of this new rule on social shareholder 
proposals would be a potential area of interest for future exploration.  
Overall, this study contributes to the accumulating literature on corporate gender 
diversity and performance, while introducing a new angle by incorporating the public sphere 
through the social movement, #MeToo. Although this movement did not have significant 
positive effects on gender-related proposals, it is encouraging to see that across the socially 
oriented shareholder resolution space, there has been a dramatic increase in the votes these types 
of resolutions have received, especially in the years since 2017. Moving forward, it is likely that 
workplace conduct issues related to sexual harassment and abuse will increasingly become a 
catalyst for social shareholder activism, as more high-profile companies become affected, and 
investors realize the substantive material and social risks involved. The #MeToo movement may 
have started the conversation around these issues, but gender-related activism has only started 
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